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THE UNACCOUNTABILITY OF THE
ACCOUNTING REGULATORS:
ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BOARD
WHITNEY INNES*
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the fall-out of major investment companies such as
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, issues of financial security and
economic stability have never been more important.' Currently,
twenty-six major companies are under investigation following the
recent market collapse, and authorities are looking into accounting
fraud concerns. 2 With the financial market in an uproar, it is easy
to see the significant power held by government agencies that
regulate financial matters. 3 With more companies being accused
of fraudulent activity, the need to regulate and enforce penalties
4
on these companies is greater than ever.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
J.D. Candidate 2010, The John Marshall Law School.
1. See Former President Bush's Remarks on the National Economy, 44
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1225, 1226 (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2008_presidentialdocuments&docid=pd22seO8_txt-24.pdf (emphasizing the seriousness of the
current financial crisis and the need for confidence to be restored in the
market); Jeff Cox, Bailout Failure Intensifies Fear in Stock Market, Sept. 29,
2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/26945122 (reporting that the fall in financial
giants such as Lehman Brothers and other investment companies has led to a
financial emergency).
2. Alan Zibel, Fannie, Freddie Disclose Subpoenas, Investigations, Sept.
29,
2008,
http://www.usatoday.commoney/economy/housing/200809-29fannie-freddie N.htm.
3. See Press Release, Bob Barr, Congress Should Vote No on Bailout (Sep.
29, 2008), available at http://www.lp.org/news/press-releases/congress-shouldvote-%E2%80%98no%E2%80%99-on-bailout-says-bob-barr (expressing concern
that the cause of the recent financial instability is the government's failure to
adequately investigate fraud or adjust accounting rules to account for the
numerous markets within the financial industry).
4. See Kelli Arena, FBI Probing Bailout Firms, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/23/news/companies/fbifinance/index.htm
(showing that the FBI is looking into possible mortgage fraud in the recent
bankruptcies of Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, and AIG).
*
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"Commission") and the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB" or "Board") are two agencies with significant
power over the regulation and enforcement of financial and
accounting standards. 5 Together, both the SEC and PCAOB hold
considerable power in the current financial crisis. 6 Unlike the
SEC, the PCAOB is completely shielded from presidential control,
leading some to wonder whether a government agency possesses
too much control.
An issue of first impression recently reached the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
("District of Columbia Circuit") regarding the constitutionality of
an independent agency having the sole authority to remove
members of another
independent agency only after a finding of
"good cause." 7 In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board s an accounting firm 9 brought suit
against the PCAOB, claiming the structure of the Board
unconstitutionally restricted the president's power to remove
officers of the Board.' 0 In a 2-1 decision, the District of Columbia
Circuit found the PCAOB to be constitutional, affirming"' the
district court's decision. 12 Recently, in a 5-4 decision, the District
of Columbia Circuit denied an en banc rehearing, and the Free
Enterprise Fund subsequently filed an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.1 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May
5. Steve Seidenberg, Suit Challenges Sarbanes Audit COP, 5 No. 7 A.B.A.
J. E-REPORT 3 (Feb. 17, 2006).

6. Id.
7. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667,
674 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
8. Id.
9. The accounting firm Beckstead & Watts had previously been reviewed
by the PCAOB in 2004 and was found to have not acted in conformity with
accounting standards on eight prior occasions. Jane B. Quinn, Lawsuit
Threatens Sarbanes-Oxley Act, WASHINGTON POST, July 20, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp.dyn/content/article/2008/07/19/AR2008071
900106.html. Specifically, Beckstead & Watts had failed to disclose and look
into the transactions of companies they were auditing on eight separate
occasions. Id. The PCAOB, therefore, filed suit against Beckstead & Watts.
Id. Thereafter, Beckstead & Watts brought this lawsuit against the PCAOB
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the halt of the PCAOB's
investigation against Beckstead & Watts. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 670.
10. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 670.
11. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 060217(JR), 2007 WL 891675, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007).
12. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685. Notably, Justice Kavanaugh, in his
dissent, considered this case to be the "most important separation-of-powers
case regarding ... removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years."
Id.
In addition to expressing the significance of the majority's decision,
Justice Kavanaugh included a thirty page dissent expressing his concern with
the outcome of the case. Id. at 685-715.
13. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 52297.
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18, 2009, and is set to hear the case before June 2010.14
This Comment will argue against the constitutionality of the
PCAOB, enacted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("Sarbanes-Oxley Act" or "Act"). 15 Part II will give a brief history
of the executive's power to remove government officers, explaining
the importance of allowing the president to have authority over
the removal of government officials, as well as where the removal
power stands today. Part II will also describe the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the purpose for its enactment. It will further explain the
creation of the PCAOB under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
powers conferred to the Board members. In addition, Part II of
this Comment will discuss the SEC's role in governing the board
members of the PCAOB.
In Part III, this Comment will analyze the District of
the
regarding
decision 16
recent
Circuit's
Columbia
constitutionality of the PCAOB, as well as Justice Kavanaugh's
Also, the Comment will compare this
dissenting opinion. 17
decision with other Supreme Court cases to examine the decision's
conformity with precedent. Additionally, Part II will explain why
the structure of the PCAOB unduly restricts the president's
In Part IV, the Comment will propose an
removal power.
amendment to the structure of the PCAOB to avoid any
constitutional issues as well as additional amendments to the
PCAOB to ease criticisms over its setup.

The petition argues that the case warrants Supreme Court review because the
issue goes "to the heart of the relationship between the Legislative and
Executive Branch." Id. at *7.
14. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667
(D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08861).
15. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
16. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685.
17. Although this Comment is focused on the removal issue presented
within the case, the plaintiffs also brought a claim against the PCAOB stating
that the Appointments Clause of the Constitution had been violated as well.
Id. at 668-69. This was based on the fact that members of the PCAOB are
appointed by the SEC, and heads of offices are not allowed to appoint unless
the position is one that is considered an inferior office. Id. at 671-72. This
Comment will show that the PCAOB is not an inferior office, and therefore the
president also must appoint members of the PCAOB with the advise and
consent of the Senate. See Comment infra Section III (analyzing the PCAOB
under the Edmond's test). This Comment, however, focuses on the PCAOB's
restrictions on the president's removal power, rather than a potential
Appointments Clause violation.
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BACKGROUND

A. The Purposeand History of Executive Removal Power
Article II Section II of the Constitution vests the appointment
18
power of governmental officials in the executive branch.
Although not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the
president's power to remove officers 19 of the government has been
inherently found in Article II Section II, following the
The authority of the
Congressional Convention of 1789.20
president to remove government officers is important in order to
ensure separation of powers between the legislative and executive
branches, and to emphasize the purpose of vesting the executive
21
power in one person to create a unified democracy.
The first Supreme Court case to thoroughly analyze the scope
of the president's power to remove government officers was Myers
v. United States.22 There, the Court found that the president had
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This clause reads as follows:
[The President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law ......
19. The Supreme Court has interpreted "officers" of the government to
include persons who hold executive positions under the government and
exercise significant authority as a result of the position. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976).
20. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481-82 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). During the
Convention, James Madison found that the power of removal was "incident[al]
to the power of appointment." Id. Madison also declared that in order for the
president to act in his fullest capacity, he must also have the power to remove
government officials. Id. This would allow for the president to ensure that the
laws were being faithfully executed. Id. at 482. Madison's opinion is in
conformity with the framers' intention on setting up a strong unitary
executive branch. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE 33-34 (Yale University Press ed., New Haven & London
2008).
21. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926). The argument in
support of the president's power to remove officials came from the
Constitution's language which vests the "executive power in the President."
Id. at 117. Congressional members believed that this language gave the
president a grant of power to execute the laws of the land. Id. Therefore, in
order to execute these laws, the president needed the authority to appoint
officials to assist him as well as remove them when the president no longer
had confidence in their abilities or judgments. Id.
22. Id. at 109. There, the president was required by statute to receive
consent from the Senate before removing first-, second-, and third-class
postmasters from their official capacity. Id. at 107. However, the issue of the
president's removal power had previously been briefly discussed in dicta
within past Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Shurtleff v. United States, 189
U.S. 311, 317 (1903) (finding that under article II section 4 the president may
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exclusive authority to remove officers 23 of the government, and
Congress could not impede on that authority. 24 The Court found
that the president's removal power extended to all officers
appointed and given executive authority by the president,
including those who were also responsible for quasi-judicial
duties. 25 Therefore, the Court found that the postmaster in Myers
could only be removed by the President. 26 Following the Court's
decision in Myers, numerous decisions have reiterated and reemphasized the importance of giving the president the authority to
27
remove government officials.
Following Myers, the first case to limit the president's
28
removal power was Humphrey's Executor v. United States.
There, the Court allowed Congress to limit the president's removal
power over the Federal Trade Commissioner 29 ("FTC") by
requiring the president to find just cause before removal. 30 In its
remove executive officers for other causes than treason, bribery, and high
crimes and misdemeanors if he deems the cause sufficient); Parsons v. United
States, 167 U.S. 324, 340 (1897) (stating debates and opinions showed a
continued practice of providing unlimited removal power to the president); In
Re Hennan, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 230, 233 (1839) (finding the removal power
belongs exclusively to the president).
23. The postmaster's functions, powers, and duties were transferred to the
United States Postal Service in 1970. Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No.
91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970).
24. Myers, 272 U.S. at 114.
25. Id. at 135. Quasi-judicial refers to a position that is essentially judicial
in character, but not constitutionally prescribed to the role. Kevin T. Abikoff,
The Role of the Comptroller General in Light of Bowsher v. Synar, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1987). Examples include members of the board of county
commissioners, and city councils. Carolyn M. Van Noy, The Appearance of
FairnessDoctrine:A Conflict in Values, 61 WASH. L. REV. 533, 535 (1986).
26. Myers, 272 U.S. at 163-64.
27. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 731-33 (1989) (emphasizing the
importance of allowing the president to remove those with significant
authority); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928) (stating
that unless the removal power is specifically provided for, the president
retains sole authority to remove officers of the government); Morgan v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 115 F.2d 990, 992-93 (6th Cir. 1940) (finding absent a specific
removal provision, the president retains the power to remove government
official pursuant to his duty to make sure "the laws are faithfully executed").
28. 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). There, President Roosevelt attempted to
remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission after deciding that the
member did not share his same beliefs and goals. Id. at 618-19. The
commissioner refused to resign, stating that under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the president may only remove a commissioner for
"inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. at 619.
29. The FTC was enacted in order to regulate unfair trade and practices in
commerce.
Dirs. of the Colum. L. Rev. Ass'n, Inc., The Federal Trade
Commission and Reform of the Administrative Process, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 671,
672 (1962). The FTC was formed in accordance with the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
30. Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 629. Although this decision did not overrule
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opinion, the Court distinguished Myers, stating that unlike the
postmaster who was a "purely" executive officer, the FTC needed
independence 31 from executive authority because of its roles in
both the judicial and legislative branches, as well as the
executive. 32 Therefore, the Court in Humphrey's concluded that
the ability of the president to have exclusive removal power only
extends to purely executive officers. 33 In contrast, for positions
such as the FTC, where impartiality justified independence from
the president, Congress is able to limit the president's removal
34
authority to an extent.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson again
limited the president's removal power.3 5 There, the Court found
36
Congress' good cause restriction on removing an inferior
37
executive officer by the attorney general, who is an alter ego of
the president, constitutional.38 The Court emphasized that the

the holding in Myers, it raised doubt as to the scope of the decision. Id. at 63031.
31. The term independent agency is used to describe any governmental
regulatory body created by statute that is outside of the executive branch's
departments. Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 615-16 (2006). Examples include
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and the United States
Environmental Protections Agency ("EPA"). Id. at 616 n.7.
32. Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 629. Specifically, the Court stated that the
FTC was responsible for making investigations and reports for Congress as a
legislative agency, as well as acting as a master in chancery under the judicial
system by conducting investigations. Id. at 628.
33. Id. at 631-32. The Supreme Court's holding in Humphrey's shifted the
government's view that there were three formal branches of government into a
more functionalist approach aimed at flexibility. Peter P. Swire, Incorporation
of Independent Agencies Into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766, 1767-68
(1985). See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (holding
constitutional a requirement that the president may only remove a member of
the Sentencing Commission for good cause); Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S.
349, 353 (1958) (affirming Congress' ability to restrict the president's removal
power when independence from the executive branch is needed).
34. Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 629.
35. 487 U.S. 654, 657 (1988).
36. An inferior officer is a position with limited executive duties, and
Congress may by law "vest the appointment of such inferior Officers ... in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
37. The attorney general of the United States is in charge of the
Department of Justice, which is an executive branch department.
U.S.
Department
of
Justice:
Office
of
the
Attorney
General,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/about-oag.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
38. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 658. The Act in question allowed for the attorney
general to appoint an independent counsel to investigate officers of the United
States when he perceived wrongdoings in governmental roles, such as the
Justice Department in this case. Id. at 654. In Morrison, independence from
the president was needed because the target of the investigations conducted
by the independent counsel included the president, vice president, and other
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critical question in deciding whether limits on the president's
removal power were constitutional is to analyze if the removal
restrictions hamper the president's ability to perform his
39
constitutional duties.
B. The Removal Power as It Stands Today
Although the cases interpreting the extent of the president's
removal power are at times unclear, a few principles have been
established.
First, the president has the power to remove
government officials who are deemed "purely executive," and
Congress may not impose any limitations on this power. 40 In
contrast, Congress may limit the president's removal power if it is
41
an office where independence from the president is necessary.
But Congress may never completely extinguish the president's
ability to remove government officials. 42 Although the Supreme
Court has composed general rules outlining the president's
removal power, commentators and analysts still find the
43
limitations on removal power controversial.
C. The SEC and the Enactment of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct
One of the most important delegations of power by the
president is the ability to regulate the financial markets and the
economy. 44 The SEC was enacted under the Securities Exchange
Act of 193445 and provided the Commission with authority to
oversee the financial and securities markets in the United

high-ranking officials within the executive branch. Id. at 661. The Sentencing
Committee was also a temporary agency and only lasted for the duration of
the lawsuit. Id.
39. Id. at 691. The Court found that the president's power over the
independent counsel was not completely stripped away since the president
retained ample authority over the attorney general. Id. at 692.
40. Myers, 272 U.S. at 109.
41. Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 628.
42. See id. at 631-32 (finding that the president may remove the federal
trade commissioner for cause).
43. Compare Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 83-84 (1994) (stating that Congress
enacts independent agencies in order to diminish presidential control); with
PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE & ABUSE OF

EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 224 (University Press of Kansas 2002) (finding
that the ability of the president to take any action he wishes as to the removal
of governmental officials is far too broad).
44. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 677-78 (stating that the president
gave the SEC authority to make rules and investigate the financial industry).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
enacted to empower the SEC to have broad authority over all aspects of the
securities industry.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
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States. 46 With the advice and consent of the Senate, the president
has the ability to appoint the five members of the SEC and has the
sole authority to remove its members for cause. 47 Because the
president appoints the SEC commissioners and the SEC is an
independent agency overseeing financial aspects typically
controlled by the government, the SEC is an extension of the
4s
president's control.
49
In response to major corporate company accounting scandals
during 2002, the legislature enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 50
Companies such as Enron eventually collapsed, after years of
inaccurate accounting reporting that led to massive misstatements
within financial reports. 51 The purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
was to establish new and enhanced accounting standards for
public firms as well as to provide extra security to shareholders
and investors in the financial markets. 52 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
also created new regulations among auditors and other accounting
46. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/about/
laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). This for-cause restriction on the president's removal
power makes the SEC an independent agency. See MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC,
380 F.3d 611, 619 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding the president had an implied right to
remove SEC commissioners for cause).
48. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange
Commission: The Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38
(1998) (stating that the "SEC is an independent federal agency organized as a
commission").
49. For example, Enron was involved in a fraudulent reporting scandal
with its accounting firm Arthur Anderson, which resulted in the dissolution of
the company as well as criminal charges for fraud in financial reporting.
Bruce Nussbaum, Can You Trust Anyone Anymore?, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 28,
2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_04lb3767701.htm.
These scandals were a direct result of a company's failure to separate
ownership of the company from control of the company. HENRY N. BUTLER &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE 1 (The AEI Press 2006).

50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1. See also Christine N. Parise, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 33, 33 (2002) (finding that the SarbanesOxley Act was enacted hastily to combat problem in corporate corruption
scandals).
Since its enactment, many commentators have expressed
skepticism and disagreement over the benefits of enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49, at 6 (illustrating the
negative effects Sarbanes-Oxley has on the market value of companies and
questioning the ability of the Act to prevent future scandals).
51. Kristin Kenny, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Balancing the Rights of Investors
and the Rights of Corporate Officers, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 151,
161-62 (2003).
52. Parise, supra note 50, at 33-35. Legislatures believed the SarbanesOxley Act was necessary in order to restore confidence in the nation's capital
markets after the risks Enron had exposed to potential investors. See 148
CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6327 (2002) (finding that the public's distrust in the
financial market posed a threat to the health of the economy). Legislatures
also believed the Act would improve the quality of independent accounting
services and strengthen the independence of auditing firms as well. Id.
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professionals to protect against future accounting disasters. 53
In order to ensure that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was faithfully
executed, legislators required the creation of the PCAOB. 54 They
found that the previous self-governing policies of the accounting
standards had failed, 55 and public corporations now needed an
independent board to investigate, regulate, and punish violators of
56
accounting and financial fraud.
The PCAOB is composed of five full-time members 57 who

53. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires an auditing firm to
rotate its lead auditor every five years in an attempt to catch any irregular
accounting practices by a previous auditing firm. Robert A. McTamaney, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Will it Prevent Future "Enrons?", LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 9, 2002, at 2. Additionally, an auditor may not accept

any consulting or advisory compensation fees because an auditor is only
allowed to perform auditing procedures on a company. Id.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006) (stating that "[t]here is established the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to oversee the audit of public
companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order
to protect the interests of investors."). Besides the creation of the PCAOB, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is aimed at enhancing financial disclosure, regulating
securities conflicts of interest, regulating corporate governance, and enhancing
the SEC's ability to regulate the financial market. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson &
Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM.
MITCHELL

L. REV.

1149,

1149

(2004)

(examining the

provisions

and

implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
55. Prior to the regulations imposed by the Act, accounting standards were
self-regulated, and auditors were not required to maintain complete
Jeremy S. Blocher, Inspection and
independence from companies.
Investigation of Public Accounting Firms Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Real
Reform?, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 741, 745-46 (2000).

Problems arose when

companies began misrepresenting corporate earnings in order to give the false
impression of revenue growth to potential investors.

BUTLER & RIBSTEIN,

supra note 49, at 7-11.
56. 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6330 (statement of Mr. Sarbanes).
However, during the Congressional debate, Senator Gramm voiced his concern
with the PCAOB's ability to create too many regulations concerning
accounting standards without supervision. 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6334.
Instead, Mr. Gramm found that accounting standards should not be able to fit
into a "one-size-fits-all" category and should be subjected to individual rather
than government regulation. 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6335.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1). Each board member of the PCAOB has to satisfy
the following criteria: (1) be a prominent individual of integrity and
reputation; (2) be able to demonstrate commitment to public interest and
interest of investors; (3) understands issuer's responsibilities for financial
disclosure under the securities laws; and (4) understands the obligations of
auditors in reporting on financial statements. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL,
SARBANES-OXLEY IN PERSPECTIVE 23 (Subrata Paul ed., West Group 2002).

Of the five members, two members of the Board have to be certified public
accountants. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2). But there cannot be more than two
certified accountants either. Id. This is troubling considering that these
Board members are in charge of all accounting regulations for public
companies, and three of the members are not experienced in accounting
practices.
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serve five-year terms, not exceeding a ten-year maximum. 58 The
SEC has the authority to appoint the chairperson and other board
members of the PCAOB. 59 Further, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gives
the Commission the ability to remove members of the PCAOB only
for good cause. 60 When creating the PCAOB, Congress determined
that the Board needed to be separated from the SEC in order to
provide "an extra guarantee of its independences and its plenary
authority" to deal with accounting concerns. 61 Among other
duties, 62 the PCAOB is given the power to establish rules and
standards for accounting firms relating to the preparation of audit
reports, to conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings, as
well as to conduct inspections of registered public accounting
firms. 63 Although the SEC must approve rules written by the
PCAOB, the Board's investigatory and enforcement powers remain
virtually isolated from SEC control. 64 The SEC also retains
authority in reviewing and, more importantly, modifying
disciplinary actions taken by the PCAOB during the course of
investigations. 65
These restrictions are the most important
58. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(5).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4).

60. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6). The SEC's good-cause removal power is limited
to a finding that a PCAOB board member:
(A) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, the rules of the
Board, or the securities laws; (B) has willfully abused the authority of
that member; or (C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has
failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule, or any
professional standard by any registered public accounting firm or any
associated person thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2006).
61. 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6331 (statement by Mr. Sarbanes). It is
interesting to note that before enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress
debated over the need for an independent board. See 148 CONG. REC. S632706, S6335 (stating that some legislators did not find a need for the Board, and
instead believed the SEC should handle such an important responsibility to
allow for more regulation from the executive branch).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)(2)(3)(4).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(g). Members of Congress who disagreed with the
setup of the PCAOB found that this restriction was meaningless, instead
arguing that the board members would be given "massive unchecked
authority." 148 CONGR. REC. S6327-06, S6334.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(c)(3). Additionally, although not expressly written in
the statute, final SEC decisions on PCAOB disciplinary proceedings are
reviewable by a federal circuit court. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo
with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977 (2005) (arguing that the PCAOB is a public
actor for purposes of state law and constitutional issues because it registers
accounting firms that audit public companies, enacts rules for auditing, and
imposes discipline on accounting firms). Included in the statute creating the
PCAOB was a section stating that "[n]o member... [of] the Board shall be
deemed to be an officer ... of the Federal Government." 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b).
But the Supreme Court has previously disagreed in other contexts, finding
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regulations given to the SEC to monitor and control the PCAOB's
66
actions.
Since the creation and enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, many criticisms have been voiced by those affected by the new
regulations. 67
For instance, commentators claim that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has kept many companies from going public
68
and also caused previously public companies to go private.
Further, studies have concluded that many provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not benefit investors, deviating from the
original intention of the bill.69 Lastly, the PCAOB also was given
the ability to regulate foreign firms attempting to do business in
the United States, causing some global firms not to register as a
70
company in the United States.
In the end, the PCAOB has been given broad authority to
71
investigate, and discipline public companies.
regulate,
Essentially, the PCAOB has become "an agency that is at once the
that when the government creates a corporation by a federal law for the
furtherance of governmental objectives, the entity is considered governmental
regardless of the statute. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S.
374, 400 (1995) (holding that Amtrak was a government entity for First
Amendment purposes). As a result of Supreme Court precedent, the PCAOB,
like Amtrak, was also found to be a government entity. Free Enter. Fund, 537
F.3d at 668.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(c).
67. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has contributed to numerous problems,
including the substantial costs incurred by companies in keeping up with the
new regulations as well as the government's intrusion into previously private
aspects of public companies. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49, at 43-44.
But see id. at 2-3 (discussing the benefits derived from the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as increased information and disclosures and
corporations taking responsibility for its actions).
68. Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation et al. in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellants Free Enter. Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP
Urging Reversal, (Aug. 3, 2009), (No. 08-861), 2007 WL 4973853.
69. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of a
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529-43 (2005) (reviewing
approximately fifty empirical studies and finding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
provisions to be largely ineffective in improving corporate governance or
performance that would protect investors).
70. See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation,
27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 225, 277-80 (2007) (stating that the PCAOB's power
over international companies created constitutional and legal concerns in
foreign countries).
71. See Perry E. Wallace, Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees After
Enron, Et. Al.: Governing Outside the Box Without Stepping Off the Edge in
the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 117 (2003) (finding that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act vested the PCAOB with significant authority to effectuate
accounting rules and regulations); See also JAMES HAMILTON & TED
TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: LAW AND EXPLANATION 20 (CCH
Incorporated 2002) (stating that the purpose of the PCAOB was to establish a
board that had broad powers to set regulatory standards for accounting
principles).
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lawmaker, the tax collector, the inspector, the sheriff, the
prosecutor, the judge, and the jury-yet without the political
accountability that normally constrains even independent
agencies." 72 With the continuation of problems facing financial
reporting, the PCAOB will continue to have significant unchecked
73
power within the government.

III.

ANALYSIS

In upholding the constitutionality of the PCAOB, the majority
opinion is anything but clear. While stressing the importance of
relying upon Supreme Court precedent, the majority fails to cite
one case in which a court has upheld the constitutionality of an
independent agency's ability to appoint and remove members of
74
another independent agency for cause.
A.

The Rationale Underlying the Majority Opinion

The court's opinion, written by Justice Rogers, began by
recognizing that in order for the Free Enterprise Fund's facial
challenge to succeed, the Fund faced a heavy burden in showing
that the "provisions of which it complains are unduly severe in all
circumstances and cannot be constitutionally applied. ' 75 After
explaining the burden of proof, the majority looked to the
president's power to remove government officers and accepted that
the inherent power to remove is encompassed within Article II of
the Constitution. 76 The court then employed three methods to find
that the PCAOB's structure is sound and therefore constitutionally
permitted: (1) by classifying the PCAOB as an inferior office
72. Brief of The Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., (Aug. 3, 2009) (No. 08861).
73. In fact, SEC Inspector David Kotz recently sent a letter to Congressman
Paul E. Kanjorski, urging Congress to expand the jurisdiction of the PCAOB
from solely regulating publicly traded companies to also regulating brokerdealers and money managers. Ian Katz, SEC Investigator Asks for Bigger
Bounty Program to Detect Fraud,THE COMPLIANCE EXCHANGE, July 2, 2009,
http://compliancex.typepad.comlcompliancex/2009/07/sec-investigator-asks-forbigger-bounty-program-to-detect-fraud-.html.
As a result, Congressman
Kanjorski recently drafted a bill stating that greater regulatory control by the
PCAOB would allow for risks to be reduced. H.R. 1212, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposed by Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski).
74. Free Enter.Fund, 537 F.3d at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 670. This standard was originally set forth in United States v.
Salerno, where the Court stated that a facial challenge to a legislative act is
"the most difficult challenge to mount successfully." 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

This is apparent because the showing of one set of facts leading to the act
being unconstitutional is not enough to overcome the heavy burden of a facial
challenge. Id. Rather, every conceivable circumstance has to lead to the act
being unconstitutional. Id.
76. Free Enter.Fund, 537 F.3d at 678-79.
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located within the SEC; (2) by looking at the Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison; and (3) by de-emphasizing the importance of
the SEC's for-cause removal limitation.
First, the court characterized the PCAOB as an inferior office
of the SEC, 77 rather than its own independent agency of the
government.7 8
This distinction was critical to the majority's
conclusion because if the PCAOB was classified as an inferior
office, the SEC would be constitutionally permitted to exercise
authority regarding appointment and removal of the members of
the PCAOB.79 Furthermore, the president's ability to remove
members of the PCAOB would not be as crucial because inferior
offices are not seen as possessing significant power in comparison
to independent agencies.8 0 In fact, the majority conceded that if
the PCAOB was classified as an independent agency, then the
81
Board's structure would be unconstitutional.
In labeling the PCAOB, the court defined an inferior office as
a position that answers to a higher-ranking official of the
executive branch, using the definition set forth in Edmond v.
United States.8 2 The court classified the PCAOB as an inferior
office because it found that the PCAOB lacked expansive decisionmaking power, as the Board is regulated by the SEC.8 3 Looking to
Edmond, the court found this "lack" of authority as decisive in
determining the PCAOB's inferior status.8 4 Although the court
acknowledged that removal authority was a factor used in
Edmond to determine the inferior status of an individual, it deemphasized the importance of this factor.8 5
Therefore, the
majority found that the PCAOB was not so far independent as to
86
classify it as its own agency.
77. Notably, even if the Court were to find the PCAOB to be an inferior
officer, neither the PCAOB nor the United States as intervener were able to
find a case where inferior officers of an independent agency are removable
only for cause. Transcript of Record at 4, Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d 667
(2008) (No. 07-5127). The lack of precedent on this structure further supports
characterizing the PCAOB as an independent agency.
78. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672.
79. See id. (stating that the Board is composed of inferior officers subject to
SEC control).
80. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that "Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper ... or in the Heads
of Departments.").
81. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681 n.9.
82. Id. at 672 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 674. The Court stated that removal power "is not the linchpin of
the analysis; rather, an officer is inferior as long as he is 'statutorily subject to
direction and supervision in all significant activities."' Id. at 674 n.4.
86. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 673-74 (declaring that the Free

Enterprise Fund overinflated the restrictions imposed by the SEC's removal
limitations).
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Second, the court rationalized the constitutionality of the
PCAOB by comparing the present case to the Supreme Court's
prior holding in Morrison.8 7 The court claimed that all functions
performed by the PCAOB are subject to oversight by the SEC,88
giving the president indirect authority in maintaining control over
the PCAOB through the SEC under his Article II powers.8 9 The
Court explained that if the president wanted to influence the
PCAOB's affairs, he could nominate SEC commissioners who
shared his same goals and ideologies. 90 The commissioners could
then appoint PCAOB members with these same goals creating a
board with the same ideals as the president. Further, the court
noted that unlike the independent counsel's significant powers in
Morrison,9 ' the PCAOB is not able to bring cases to court or issue
final decisions without the SEC's permission. 92 The court also
emphasized that the decision in Morrison was not intended as a
rigid test in defining the parameters of officers subject to removal
by the president. 9 Rather, the court asserted that the test should
look to whether Congress' enactment of the PCAOB impeded the
president's duty to execute the laws of the land.94 In this case, the
court found that the president still possessed ample authority over

87. See Free Enter.Fund, 537 F.3d at 681 (finding when the structure of the
PCAOB is analyzed within the context of Morrison, the president's powers
"extend comfortably beyond the minimum required to 'perform his
constitutionally assigned duties').
88. However, this is debatable because under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
PCAOB enjoys independence in determining the direction of which
investigations are undertaken, which firms are investigated, and who
ultimately testifies at trial. Harold S. Bloomenthal, Existence of PCAOB and
Future of Sarbanes-Oxley Threatened, 30 No. 9 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 1, 3
(2008). Further, if the PCAOB chooses not to impose a sanction on a public
firm, the SEC does not have the authority to create a sanction on a company
on its own initiative. Id. Additionally, although the PCAOB needs approval
from the SEC before enacting a law, the statute does not allow for the SEC to
create laws on its own initiative. Id.
89. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 680-81. In analyzing cases where the
PCAOB and the SEC have disagreed over proposed regulations, the powers
the PCAOB possess seem far more significant than the majority contends. For
example, in a recent dispute over a proposed regulation to an accounting
standard, the SEC did not agree with the PCAOB over an amendment and
lobbied hard to leave the standard unchanged.
Tammy Whitehouse, A
Behind-the-Curtain Look at AS5, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Feb. 26, 2008,
http://www.complianceweek.comlindex.cfm.
However, the PCAOB refused to
follow the SEC's guidance, and the standard was ultimately amended. Id.
90. FreeEnter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 682-83.
91. In that case, the independent counsel was given the power to appoint a
special prosecutor. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 657. The special prosecutor then
had limited duties concerning investigating and prosecuting certain crimes
committed by government officials during his tenure in office. Id. at 655.
92. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681.
93. Id. at 673 n.3.
94. Id. at 682.
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the PCAOB. 95 Therefore, because the court found that the PCAOB
did not impede the president's power, it upheld the
constitutionality of the Board.
Lastly, the court downplayed the for-cause limitation that
restricts the SEC's power to remove members of the PCAOB.96
The majority stated that this limitation, by itself, was insignificant
because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gave the SEC such pervasive
overall authority over the Board. 97 Therefore, although the
majority acknowledged that the PCAOB limits the president's
removal power to an extent, it found this not to be significant
enough to invalidate the Board because other parts of the statute
98
contravene the for-cause restriction's strength.
In discussing the removal power, the majority seemingly
indicated that hindering the president's removal power by itself is
not significant enough to warrant the court rendering the statute
unconstitutional. 99 The court proceeded on the notion that
although the limits on the executive's removal power may not be
constitutional, the court would not invalidate the PCAOB because
the SEC is still able to regulate parts of the Board. 100 The court
ultimately seemed concerned that invalidating the PCAOB would
lead to constitutional problems with other existing independent
agencies and did not want this to occur. 101 As it stands now, the
future of the PCAOB is unclear. With the Supreme Court
granting review, the court's decision will ultimately have
02
significant impacts on the regulatory industry.
B. Analyzing the Court's Opinion and the Reasoning
Employed
In analyzing the reasoning underlying the court's opinion in
95. Id. at 683-85.
96. Id. at 674 n.4.
97. Id. at 673-75.

98. Id.
99. See id. at 682 (stating that the plaintiffs contentions were an
exaggerated response to a "relatively insignificant innovation").
100. Id. at 683-84.
101. Id. at 683.
102. Id. Commentators have indicated that Justice Scalia may take this as
an opportunity to expand again the broad grant of removal power in the
executive branch as he has openly voiced his disapproval in his dissenting
opinion in Morrison. See Stephen Bainbridge, Peekaboo, the Constitution
Doesn't See You, TCS DAILY, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.tcsdaily.com
article.aspx?id=021406B
(analyzing Scalia's opinion on limiting the
President's removal power in the context of the PCAOB's structure). It is also
interesting to note that Justice Kavanaugh clerked for Justice Kennedy who
very well might be the deciding vote if this case were to reach the Supreme
Court. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Homepage, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf
/content/VL+-+Judge+-+BMK (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
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Free Enterprise Fund, it is important to remember the impact of
the majority's decision.1 03 In allowing independent agencies like
the PCAOB to exercise coercive power 10 4 over companies and
individuals, it simultaneously deprives citizens from exercising
control over these agencies due to the inability to elect members of
the PCAOB.105 The majority's reasoning is flawed in four critical
aspects: (1) the PCAOB should have been defined as an
independent agency, rather than an inferior office; (2) the opinion
goes against the PCAOB's legislative history and congressional
intent; (3) the opinion contravenes well established Supreme Court
precedent; and (4) the court underestimated the harmful impact
its decision may have.
1.

The PCAOB Is an Independent Agency Rather than an
Inferior Office

First, the PCAOB should have been defined by the court as an
independent agency, rather than an inferior office. In defining the
PCAOB as an inferior office, the court failed to consider in its
analysis the significant power prescribed to the PCAOB through
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Rather, in determining whether the
PCAOB is an independent agency, the court should have looked at
the four-factor test, as articulated in Edmond 0 6 : (1) whether the
Board is subject to removal by a higher executive branch official;
(2) whether the Board performs limited duties, with involvement

103. Some have been skeptical about finding the PCAOB to be
unconstitutional because of the failure to add a severability clause within the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which would lead to the entire act being struck down if
found unconstitutional.
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49, at 6.
Nevertheless, this could be beneficial because Congress would be able to
scrutinize and possibly restructure the Act, because the original act was
created quickly in an effort to curtail the effects of Enron. Forrest Whitesides,
PCAOB Constitutional Suit Gets Underway, THE TRUSTED PROFESSIONAL,
Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.nysscpa.org/trustedprof/207/tp2.htm.
104. These powers include the ability to enact regulatory provisions for
public companies that, among other consequences, impose significant costs on
companies. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49, at 1-3.
105. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). This
potential threat to the liberty and security of the governed was why Congress
emphasized the importance of keeping the three branches of government
separated. Id. In fact, Justice Scalia has repeatedly expressed his concern
over independent agencies in general because the president is isolated from
the ability to control public policy issues addressed by independent agencies.
KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 205
(4th ed. 2004).
106. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 661-62. Although the majority opinion mentioned
Edmond, it failed to analyze the PCAOB in terms of all four factors, instead
stating merely that Judge Kavanaugh's test was unfounded. See Free Enter.
Fund, 537 F.3d at 675 (claiming that "our dissenting colleague's two-part test
for determining inferior status ... sets up a new paradigm in order to reach a
desired result,").
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in minimal administrative tasks; (3) whether the Board has
limited jurisdiction; and (4) whether the Board has limited
10 7
tenure.
Here, although the PCAOB is subject to removal by a "higher
authority" in a sense, the SEC is not collectively a member of the
executive branch and instead is an independent agency.10 8 This is
important because the SEC is not a part of the executive branch
and consequently does not give the president power over it by
default, especially considering the for-cause limitations on the
ability to remove SEC commissioners. 10 9 Next, the PCAOB does
not perform limited governmental duties. Instead, the PCAOB not
only enforces laws and regulations imposed on public companies in
a regulatory sense but also enacts rules governing accounting
standards and essentially taxes public companies by creating a
supporting fee payable to the Board.1 1 0 Therefore, the Board's
powers reach far beyond performing limited duties or minimal
administrative tasks. As to the third factor, the PCAOB does not
have limited jurisdiction.
Instead, the PCAOB affects a farreaching majority of the country, considering its ability to regulate
every public company and accounting firm doing business in the
United States. 1 1 The PCAOB also seems to gain power as the size
of both companies and accounting firms increases. Last, the
PCAOB was not enacted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for a
limited tenure. 112 Instead, the PCAOB was created by Congress to
have a permanent role within the accounting regulatory and

107. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 661-62. A test similar to the Edmond test was
used in Morrison to differentiate between an inferior and principal officer, and
the same test would be used in deciding independent agency status. Morrison,
487 U.S. at 672-73. This is the same test because finding the PCAOB to be a
principal officer would then qualify it as an independent agency because the
SEC is not considered a part of the executive branch. Id. The Supreme Court
in Morrison found that the independent counsel was an inferior officer after
finding that his appointment was for a limited tenure, was only for violations
of the government, and the counsel had no authority to perform
administrative functions. Id.
108. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 701 n.9 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority's attempt to categorize the PCAOB as an inferior
officer "defies long-accepted terminology and does not account for the meaning
and effect of for-cause removal restrictions").
109. When a government office is part of the executive branch, the president
has at-will removal power and has the ability to influence these officers into
acting in conformity with his beliefs. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 20, at 16.
110. As stated above, the PCAOB is in charge of enacting new regulations,
enforcing those regulations through investigations, and prosecuting companies
if necessary. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a). Recently, the SEC is asking Congress to increase
the reach of the PCAOB by allowing the Board to audit reports regarding
issuers, brokers, dealers, and any other companies that are subject to
securities laws. H.R. 1212.
112. 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6630 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
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enforcement process.
Therefore, when analyzed under the
Edmond test employed by the Supreme Court, the majority should
have categorized the PCAOB as an independent agency rather
113
than an inferior office.
The for-cause limitation is also problematic for the majority's
contention that the PCAOB is an inferior office. The SEC's true
inferior officers, such as the SEC general counsel, are removable at
will by the SEC and perform minimal tasks in comparison to the
PCAOB.114 In contrast, the SEC is only given authority to remove
a PCAOB member after a finding of willful misconduct. 115 This
removal limitation does not allow the SEC to remove a board
member with whom they disagree, or a member who fails to act in
a particular way. 116
Ultimately, when analyzed under the
Edmond test, and taking into account the for-cause removal
limitation, the PCAOB is an independent agency rather than an
inferior office of the SEC.117
2.

The Majority Opinion Conflicts with Legislative History
and CongressionalIntent

Second, the court's finding that the president is not stripped
of his power to regulate the PCAOB because the SEC maintains
control over the Board and the president in turn has power over
the SEC is far-reaching. 1 1 In determining Congress' intent in
assigning the SEC with the power to appoint and remove members
of the PCAOB, the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is

113. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 709-10 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(finding that the majority incorrectly analyzed the PCAOB by looking solely at
whether or not the PCAOB was monitored by the SEC).
114. Id. at 703.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3).
116. Id.
117. The majority seems to concede that if a court were to define the PCAOB
as an independent office, then the PCAOB's removal structure would be
unconstitutional. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681 n.9 (stating that
"[i]ndeed, with that premise [that the Board is itself an independent agency],
the dissent's conclusion that the Board's structure is unconstitutional
conveniently follows.").
118. In fact, the SEC chairman has criticized the PCAOB because of the
excessive and overburdening internal governance regulations enacted by its
members.
David M. Katz, Sarbox on Ice?, CFO, Feb. 1, 2007,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8628974/c_8649159.
This further calls into
doubt the ability of the SEC to monitor and control the PCAOB effectively. Id.
Former President Bush also commented on the implementation of accounting
rules enacted under the PCAOB, stating that there needed to be a change in
the way the PCAOB implemented its laws. Id. This statement came as a
response to the high costs imposed on businesses due to the rules enacted by
the PCAOB under the Act. Id.
However, under its current structure,
President Obama is unable to use his executive power to fix these problems.

Id.
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informative. 119 Throughout the debates over the enactment of the
PCAOB and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the congressional record
includes a discussion on the importance of the independence of the
Board numerous times. 120 In fact, when the Act was brought to
Congress, Senator Gramm emphasized that the purpose of the Act
was to give the PCAOB powerful, unchecked authority that
affected everyone in the country one way or another.' 21 Therefore,
the majority cannot contend that the PCAOB is not powerful,
when the senators involved in the creation of the statute directly
stated otherwise and stressed the importance of allowing the
PCAOB to be independent and powerful. 122 Instead, looking at the
legislative history surrounding the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act provides us with the roles Congress expected the
123
PCAOB to have.
Further support for Congress' intention in creating the
PCAOB as a powerful entity is granting the Board with the ability
to tax and generate its own revenue. 124 In order to register with
the PCAOB there is a support fee, which becomes part of the
Board's annual budget. 125 This stands in sharp contrast to other

119. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 687-88 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(stating that the decision to isolate the PCAOB from executive control was not
inadvertent).
120. See 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6330-38 (categorizing and emphasizing
the need for the PCAOB's independence fifteen times throughout Congress'
proposal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
121. See 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6333-34 (statement by Sen. Gramm)
(stating that "I would have to say the board ... I set up in our bill has massive
unchecked power .... [T]hat is the nature of what we are trying to do here.").
Further, Senator Sarbanes, when introducing the structure of the PCAOB,
labeled it a "strong independent board." 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6330.
122. Compare Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681 (explaining that the Board
is made up of inferior officers and the SEC has complete and absolute
authority over the PCAOB), with 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06, S6331
(emphasizing that the Board was created to be independent from the SEC).
123. In fact, Senator Gramm urged Congress to "think long and hard...
about this board exerting tremendous, unbridled, unchecked power." 148
CONG. REC. S6327-06, 86334. Senator Gramm ultimately voted for enacting
this law, knowing that the PCAOB would have substantial power in the
decision making of the United States. The U.S. Congress Votes Database,
WASHINGTON POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/ (last visited
Sept. 8, 2009).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 7219(d)(1) (explaining that the Board is allowed to
charge a reasonable accounting support fee to establish and maintain the
The PCAOB sets fees for public companies based upon the
PCAOB).
company's equity market capitalization. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(g).
125. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1. It is estimated that the rules set up by the
PCAOB cost public companies a total of thirty-five billion dollars per year.
John Berlau, Puts & Calls: Sarbanes-Oxley 'Reform' Harming Economy,
COMPETITIVE

ENTERPRISE

INSTITUTE,

Nov.

15,

2005,

Additionally, members of the PCAOB
http://cei.org/gencon/019,04988.cfm.
make an average of $515,500 a year, far higher than other governmental
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governmental entities where both Congress and the president
have a role in setting up the agency's budget and limiting the
particular agency's spending, inherently giving the president
power over those agencies. 126 Rather, the PCAOB's fee revenue
generating ability allows independence in creating a massive
budget with limitless opportunities, including excessive wages.
Therefore, the PCAOB's ability to generate an unlimited surplus of
revenue further separates the president from the ability to
127
monitor the PCAOB through budgetary regulations.
3. Supreme Court Precedent Contravenes the Majority's
Reasoning
Third, Supreme Court precedent runs contrary to the
reasoning employed by the majority. 128 When contemplating the
scope of the president's authority to remove government officers,
Myers emphasized the broad ranging power the president
possessed. 129 Since that decision, the Supreme Court has only
allowed Congress to limit the president's removal power on two
occasions' 30 and only with skepticism. 131 Thus, the limitations in
the case should not be used to expand the circumstances in which

entities. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD 2008 BUDGET 1
(2008),
http://www.pcaobus.org/About the PCAOB/BudgetPresentations/
2008.pdf. In fact, Aiken, the SEC chairman, stated that members of the
PCAOB make more per year than three SEC commissioners combined. Sarah
Johnson, SEC Rails Against PCAOB Salary Hike, CFO, Dec. 18, 2007,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10327975. Therefore, the court should not have
found that the PCAOB are "inferior officers" of the SEC when, among others
reasons, they make triple the salary of a commissioner.
126. In fact, the majority states one of the ways in which the president
usually controls independent agencies is his budgetary influence. Free Enter.
Fund, 537 F.3d at 680. However, this is not the case here as the Board does
not need any type of budget from the president due to the fees charged to
public companies when regulating accounting standards. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(d).
127. For instance, the PCAOB's budget was $103 million in 2004 which was
twice that of other regulatory agencies such as the National Association of
Securities Dealers. PETER J. WALLISON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, REIN IN THE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BOARD (Feb. 2005), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050124-FSO
February2005.pdf.
128. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 697 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating
that the text, history, and precedent of the president's removal power indicate
that the PCAOB is unconstitutional).
129. Myers, 272 U.S. at 121-22.
130. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686 (allowing limitations on removal power when
an alter ego of the president retained the power); Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 629
(restricting the president's removal power by allowing Congress to impose a
good-cause limitation on removal of members of the FTC).
131. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
the statute had deprived the president of the powers granted to him in the
Constitution and hampered on separation of powers within the government).
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132
Congress may limit the executive's removal power even further.
Both Humphrey's and Morrison were narrow and limited
exceptions to the general principle that the president retains fullranging authority in removing officers of the government,
including the PCAOB.133
Moreover, even if the court were to compare Morrison's
removal limitation to the case at hand, the PCAOB remains
In Morrison, the Court reiterated the
unconstitutional.
constitutionality of a for-cause limitation on the attorney general's
removal power only because the attorney general was a direct part
1 34
of the executive branch and removable at will by the president.
In contrast, members of the PCAOB are only removable for cause
by the SEC, which is already shielded from the president by its
for-cause removal restriction. 135 Therefore, the amount of control
indirectly given to the president through the attorney general in
Morrison is far greater than the control given in the present
case. 13 6 In addition, the independent counsel at issue in Morrison
did not come into existence until the attorney general decided that
the counsel was needed and then only for a temporary period of
time. 37 By contrast, the PCAOB is continuously operating, and
the president does not control when the Board chooses to regulate
or investigate and prosecute companies.
Another distinction between Morrison and the present case is
that in the former, the president with the help of the attorney
general set out all enforcement procedures and policies to be
followed by the independent counsel. In contrast, the PCAOB has
enacted its own regulations and policies from the beginning,
without help from the president, any executive official, or the SEC

132. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)

(claiming that the PCAOB's structure provides for a previously unheard of
restriction on the president's ability to control executive officials).
133. Morrison even adds support to the claim against the constitutionality of
the PCAOB because the Court there noted that removal restrictions cannot
impede the executive branch's ability to perform constitutional duties. 487
U.S. at 691. The Court then noted that independent agencies, such as the
FTC, or the SEC are not an "arm or an eye of the executive." Id. at 688 n.25
(quoting Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 628). Therefore, the PCAOB cannot argue
that the ability of the SEC to monitor its actions is sufficient presidential
control, when independent agencies such as the SEC are considered
independent themselves.
134. Id. at 696.
135. It has been implied that the President may only remove members of the
SEC for cause. Id. at 697 n.7 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2000)). This creates
a double for-cause limitation that has never previously been allowed. Id. at
686.
136. As Justice Kavanaugh noted in his dissent, here, unlike in Morrison,
the "power to remove an executive official has been completely stripped from
the President." Id. at 698 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison, 487
U.S. at 692).
137. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666-67.
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that supposedly substantially regulates the Board. 138 To the
extent that the majority used the Supreme Court's holding in
Morrison, it should have found that the case stressed the
importance of allowing the president to regulate agencies that
execute the laws of the land by giving removal authority. Instead,
the PCAOB is operating as an executor of the laws without any
sort of presidential regulation. Therefore, when analyzed under
Morrison, the PCAOB's removal restrictions have greatly
expanded those limitations granted by the Supreme Court.
4.

The Majority De-emphasizes the Harmful Impact of the
PCAOB's Structure Which Has Never Previously Been
Allowable

Fourth, the majority denounces the significance of the lack of
precedent concerning the structure similar to that of the
PCAOB.139 The absence of case law to support this type of forcause removal limitation on the president's removal power
suggests that the PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional because
the Court has already articulated the farthest-reaching limitations
allowable. The Supreme Court has always strictly adhered to the
text of Article II and the limitations of the removal power by
continuously rejecting other governmental structures that have
1 40
contravened longstanding separation of powers principles.
Additionally, the majority's declaration that the SEC's forcause limitation on removal is not of importance because the
1
PCAOB is heavily regulated and monitored by the SEC 41 is
unpersuasive. Although the SEC was given power under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to monitor certain activities performed by the
PCAOB, this alone is not enough to circumvent a finding of
unconstitutionality. The majority points to the fact that the SEC
is able to review decisions and sanctions authorized by the PCAOB
as evidence that the PCAOB is heavily regulated. 142 Under this
reasoning one could then argue that entities like the Supreme
Court are heavily regulated because Congress may pass laws
circumventing a judicial opinion. Instead, the ability to review
opinions and sanctions of another agency should be seen as a
protective measure to uphold the integrity of an entity, such as the

138. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(g).

139. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 673-74.
140. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991) (explaining the power to legislate is
encroaching in nature, and courts should keep that in mind when determining
the evasiveness of a statute); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34 (finding that
Congress' encroachment into the executive's removal power is impermissible).
141. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 680-81 (declaring that the SEC has
substantial control over the powers given to the PCAOB by Congress).
142. Id. at 680-83.
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PCAOB in this case.
The Supreme Court has always stressed the importance of
separation of powers and has had no difficulty invalidating
statutes because of a failure to comply. 143 Here, the court should
not have upheld the constitutionality of the PCAOB's structure
merely because of the fear that this would invalidate the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or affect other independent agencies.144
Instead, by allowing for the PCAOB's for-cause removal limitation
within the PCAOB's framework, the majority has opened the
floodgates for Congress to enact other independent agencies that
no longer need to be accountable to the president. 145
IV.

PROPOSAL

Although the PCAOB as it stands cannot be constitutionally
permitted, there are many ways Congress could potentially change
its structure to avoid more legal problems. If the PCAOB was
struck down, Congress could revise the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
bring the PCAOB out from under the SEC's "power." Because the
entire Act would be struck down due to the lack of a severability
clause, Congress should also take the time to redraft several other
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to create a less controversial
146
and more workable regulatory environment.

143. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (emphasizing the
importance of maintaining separation of powers between the alternate
branches of government).
144. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 714 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(articulating that although finding the PCAOB unconstitutional may
invalidate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an important statute cannot allow the
judiciary to ignore the constitutional limits that have been put into place to
safeguard the three branches of government).
145. Id. at 700 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Justice Kavanaugh explained
the slippery slope argument stating that the Supreme Court has normally
"refused to take even a few steps down the hill," in contexts of upholding
unconstitutional statutes. Id. The dissent also reassured the public that
finding the PCAOB unconstitutional would not call into question all other
independent agencies as agencies such as the FTC and SEC are removable for
cause by the president. Id. at 688. This structure is exactly what was
permissible in Humphrey's, and is therefore constitutional. Id.
146. Proponents in favor of invalidating the PCAOB, and by implication the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see it as an opportunity to amend other parts of the Act,
which have had less than desirable effects. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note
49, at 86. Further, the Act could be changed by exempting small businesses
and corporations due to the extremely harsh financial burden that is placed on
these companies. Id. at 90. Lastly, proponents for the invalidation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act feel that some regulating should be left up to the states,
rather than the federal government. Id. at 93.
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Create the PCAOB as an Independent Agency Independent
of SEC Control

In order to ensure that the PCAOB is structured consistent
with the Constitution, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should be amended
to bring the Board out from the SEC's informal control. In doing
so, the PCAOB would stand as its own independent agency, rather
than an independent agency within another agency. 147 The
current positions on the PCAOB would then be up for presidential
nomination, and would be subject to appointment hearings,
analogous to other independent entities.
By amending the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in this manner, it would
then subject the PCAOB to constitutional limitations, such as
appointment by the president with the advice and consent of the
Senate, as well as the president's power to remove members of the
PCAOB.148 This amendment would also eliminate all potential
problems with the PCAOB's current structure and allow the
president to have significant authority as needed under the Article
II of the Constitution. 149 Further, taking the PCAOB out from
under the SEC's wing would not harm the Board, because the very
reason for the PCAOB's existence was to separate the Board's
powers from those handled by the SEC.150
147. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
122 Stat. 2654 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)(creating a new
independent federal agency to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). This
new agency was appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Id.
Consequently, because the PCAOB's regulatory functions are
much like this new independent agency created, the PCAOB should be
considered independent prior to any potential amendments.
148. The PCAOB as its own independent agency could still retain its forcause limitation currently set in place under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the
Supreme Court has previously allowed for limited restrictions on the executive
removal power. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692.
149. Advocates for upholding the PCAOB have argued that Former
President Bush signed the act into law himself and would not have done so if
he believed that the PCAOB hampered his executive authority. John Carney,
Short Sarbanes-Oxley's Accounting Board, DEALBREAKER, Aug. 26, 2008,
http://dealbreaker.com/2008/08/short-sarbanes-oxleys-accounti.php.
However,
presidents can benefit from a private entity insulated from presidential control
because if problems occur, the executive branch can escape accountability by
showcasing his lack of ability to control these independent agencies. Id. With
President Obama in office, the country may see a switch to a more controlled
financial industry, including the accountability of the PCAOB.
150. Analysts have mentioned that taking the PCAOB away from the SEC's
governance could indirectly harm the SEC. See WALLISON, supra note 127 at
3-4 (finding that the PCAOB's ability to generate its own revenue was the
answer to the SEC's prayers). Because the PCAOB is able to generate its own
budget through fees paid by public firms, the SEC is able to use the PCAOB to
confer tasks on the Board that may be too costly for the SEC to handle. Id. at
4. The SEC, itself being controlled by the appropriations process of the
president, does not have the ability to conduct all of the activities that it would
like, but the PCAOB has been useful in this respect. Id. This frees up the
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In recreating the PCAOB as an independent agency directly
accountable to the president, many provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act would need to be changed, including eliminating any
mention of the SEC overseeing any aspect of the PCAOB, the
removal authority, how members are appointed, and the private
sector clause. Additionally, other aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act should be amended to undo the controversial effects the Act
has had on companies in general.
1.

Changes Necessary for the PCAOB to Operateas a
ConstitutionalIndependent Agency

First, section 101(e)(4) and 107(d)(3) of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act dealing with the appointment and removal powers over
The new
members of the PCAOB need to be amended.
requirements should be drafted similar to those regulating the
SEC. The president would appoint members of the Board, with
approval by the Senate, as well as have the ability to remove
members for cause. 15 1 A confirmation hearing would be conducted
before members of the PCAOB are appointed into office so that
various members of Congress would have the chance to question
potential Board members in order to ensure that they were
qualified for the job.152 Because both the president and Congress
would determine how the Board positions are filled, they would
also be subject to public criticism if the PCAOB's performance was
subsequently substandard. Ultimately, this would indirectly allow
PCAOB members to be more responsible to the public, because
Congress would face public criticism if a Board member was
approved by Congress, yet was not doing their job sufficiently.
In allowing the PCAOB to be directly accountable to the
president, there may be concern over its effect on lessening the
extra guarantee of independence that Senators sought when
The
creating the PCAOB under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
president's removal power would therefore be subject to a forcause removal restriction. The for-cause restriction would be
similar to the one currently set up for the PCAOB under 107(d)(3),
except that the SEC would no longer be responsible for
implementation. Therefore, because the president would still not
be able to remove a member of the Board without cause, this

SEC to allocate funds to higher priority projects.
151. Under the Securities and Exchange Act, commissioners are appointed
by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. 15 U.S.C. § 78d
(a). But no more than three members may be of the same political party, and
members of different political parties are to be appointed alternately as much

as possible. Id.
152. This authority is found inherent within Art. II of the Constitution,
giving the Senate the right to review a presidential appointment. U.S. CONST.

art. II, § II.

1044

The John Marshall Law Review

[42:1019

would give the additional independence that traditionally
independent agencies receive, while still giving the president the
powers mandated under the Constitution.
Next, section 101(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would need to
be amended to eliminate the non-government structure that
Congress attempted to create. Instead, the status of the Board
could be amended to explicitly state that the PCAOB is a
153
government actor.
Although the PCAOB could be altered in other ways,
recreating the PCAOB as a true independent agency would be
most beneficial and would not require repealing the entire
154
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
2. Additional Changes that Would Be Beneficial to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Once Congress alters the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to conform to
constitutional principles, lawmakers could take this opportunity to
make other changes to the Act as well, creating a more efficient
and workable regulatory agency.
Support for redrafting provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act if
the PCAOB is found unconstitutional is shown by the many
criticisms that have appeared since the creation of the Act. For
example, a 2005 study showed that provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act, enforced by the PCAOB, have cost the United States
economy over one trillion dollars. 155 At the same time, the PCAOB
has made it extremely difficult for small companies to go public by
imposing fees as well as costly compliance regulations, in an
153. For example, the text of Section 101(b) could be changed as follows:
(b) STATUS - The Board shall be considered an independent agency of
the United States government and shall be subject to, and have all the
powers conferred upon an agency of the government. Members of the
PCAOB shall be deemed an officer, or employer of, or agent for, the
federal government by the reason of such service.
154. Alternatively, the PCAOB could be rolled into the SEC, allowing the
SEC to take over the regulations currently conducted by the PCAOB. In fact,
when Representative Oxley first wrote the Sarbanes-Oxley law, the PCAOB
was located within the confines of the SEC. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 709
n.18. The House unanimously approved this structure; however, the Senate
ultimately enacted Senator Sarbanes' proposal, which provided for an
oversight Board independent of the SEC. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 2(b)
(2002). These proposals overlook the fact that the SEC is finding it difficult to
regulate its own powers efficiently, this would not be the best option for
Congress. See Marcy Gordon, SEC Bungled Madoff Probes,Agency Watchdog
Says, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2009 http://www.boston.com/business/ar
ticles/2009/09/02/sec bungled madoff-probes agency-watchdog-says/ (stating
that the SEC missed several chances to discover Madoffs fraud).
155. IVY XIYING ZHANG, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY
STUDIES, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 25
(2005), http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/Redirect-safely.php?fname
=../pdffiles/phpEG.pdf.
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economy that is already struggling. 156 Additionally, many foreign
companies have refrained from listing with the United States due
to the conflicting requirements imposed by the PCAOB with their
157
own country's laws.
First, the PCAOB's ability to generate its own income has
been a cause for concern since the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 158 If declared its own independent agency outside of the SEC,
the PCAOB may have a harder time ensuring Congress that the
ability to generate its own revenue through fees is permissible,
since independent agencies typically rely on a budget created by
Congress. Therefore, section 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should
be amended to have the PCAOB depend upon Congress and the
president for their budget authority. 15 9 More specifically, the
PCAOB should be subject to the Annual Appropriations Budget
Process, 160 where Congress has the authority to determine the
reasonableness of an independent agency's budget. Also, the "tax"
imposed by the PCAOB from its supporting fees should be
amended so that the revenue is not solely for the PCAOB's
operating budget. Instead, they would be allotted a reasonable
amount to use in order to effectively run its agency. This would
also have the effect of creating more reasonable salaries to the
members of the PCAOB, instead of paying them amounts well
exceeding any other governmental body, including the president.

156. Beckstead and Watts, LLP Homepage, http://www.becksteadwatts.com/
(last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
157. Sarbanes-Oxley Act Aims to Fix Old Problems, Poses New Ones, WHAT
COUNTS (R.I. Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants.org, R.I.) Winter 2003, at 1,
10.
158. Commentators have previously expressed concern over the PCAOB's
ability to generate fee income in the first place, finding that it should not be
permissible to do so. Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 72.
159. Section 109(b) would need to be amended, which currently allows the
PCAOB to essentially create its own budget. Instead of being subject to the
SEC's approval, the PCAOB's budget should be overseen by Congress and
should read as follows:
(b) ANNUAL BUDGETS - The Board shall establish a budget for each
fiscal year which shall be reviewed and approved according to their
respective internal procedures not less than 1 month prior to the
commencement of the fiscal year to which the budget pertains for at the
beginning of the Board's first fiscal year. The budget of the Board shall
be subject to approval by Congress.
Additionally, Sections 109(d) and (e) would need to be amended, allowing
Congress to receive the money generated from accounting support fees and
monetary penalties, rather than the PCAOB being able to keep the profits.
This would create a structure similar to other government agencies, and the
money could be used to fund several different agency budgets throughout the
year. This would limit the ever-expanding scope that the PCAOB seems to
take.
160. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 503, 516-17 (2000).
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Another potential concern with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
that the PCAOB and SEC at times overlapped. Therefore, when
separating the PCAOB from the SEC, the two independent
agencies would be concurrently regulating the same general
industry, and their roles may overlap and could counteract one
another. 161 This could cause further strain when dealing with
economic issues, as both would be in charge of financial
regulations within the United States.
In order to overcome this concern, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
should be amended to clearly separate the powers that both the
SEC and PCAOB have within the Act. For example, because the
original Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that the Commission is also in
charge of regulating accounting principles, a firm line needs to be
drawn between the two agencies to ensure that efforts are not
being wasted by both the SEC and PCAOB by doing the same
exact tasks. 162 Congress could decide to separate the SEC and
PCAOB, allowing the PCAOB to concentrate on examining and
disciplining auditors, while the SEC could control the broader
requirements of creating general financial and accounting
regulations. This would get rid of the potential of a company being
sanctioned by both the SEC and PCAOB for a similar offense.
Lastly, the provisions dealing with the PCAOB's ability to
regulate foreign companies should be redrafted to alleviate the
conflicting burdens on foreign companies looking to register within
the United States. 163 Instead of allowing the PCAOB to expand its
scope internationally, foreign forms should be given the choice to
opt out of particular provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, so that
they are not facing conflicting regulations and forced to withdraw
from registering within the United States. Additionally, with the
PCAOB held more accountable to the president, the executive
branch could work with the PCAOB to ensure that U.S. and
foreign firms are able to work together coherently because foreign
161. The SEC is already given authority from Congress to protect investors
in the financial market.
Michael K. Wolensky & David J. Gellen,
Understanding Securities Laws: The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1198
P.L.I./CORP 395, 399 (2000). Despite this, protecting

investors was one of the

main concerns leading up the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Robert
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quick Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1592 (2005). Therefore, there are multiple
areas of law where the SEC and PCAOB could potentially overact.
162. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 7218 (stating that nothing in the SarbanesOxley Act limits or impairs the authority to create other securities and
accounting regulations).
163. For example, local privacy laws in international countries often prevent

firms from disclosing all of the information required by the PCAOB. Stavros
Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in InternationalFinancialRegulation, 49
HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 488 (2008). Although the PCAOB has accommodated

foreign companies to an extent, more work needs to be done to insure a
workable regulatory system. Id.
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diplomatic relations are important to an efficiently run
government.
In the end, amending the PCAOB to create an independent
agency, as well as providing additional changes, would not only
create a constitutional agency, but also would add additional
efficiency and value. With the PCAOB's chairman, Mark Olson,
announcing his retirement in July16 4 perhaps it is time for the rest
1 65
of the Board to "retire" as well.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although skeptics are concerned that invalidating the PCAOB
would negatively affect independent agencies and would impact
the economy due to investor's concerns, these reasons alone do not
support upholding an unconstitutional statute. 166 Instead, by
allowing for an unconstitutional agency structure to remain, it will
continue to chip away at the president's executive power, which is
central to the founder's idea of democracy.
With a democratic President faced with a struggling economy,
there is no doubt that the government will see a need for more
regulatory control and accountability. It seems as if a perfect
opportunity has been set forth to allow the next president to
164. Additionally, both senator Sarbanes and Representative Oxley have
retired from the Senate. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senator Sarbanes,
Maryland Democrat Will Retire in '06, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at A10,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/12/politics/12sarbanes.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2009) (reporting that Senator Sarbanes will not seek
reelection in 2006); William A. Niskanen, Enron's Last Victim: American
Markets, Cato Institute, Jan. 3, 2007, http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?
pub id=6879 (stating that Senator Oxley retired before the 2007 term).
165. Legislative history also shows that when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
passed, Congress was under enormous political pressure to make changes to
the financial industry. D. Skyler Rosenbloom, Note, Take it Slow: A Novel
Concept in the Life of Sarbanes-Oxley, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1185, 1192
(2006). In creating this law as a quick fix to a substantial problem without a
lot of research, critics forewarned that Sarbanes-Oxley would have unintended
consequences in the future. See Anthony Lin, One Year After Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, Many Officers See Need, but Grumble Nonetheless, 230 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1
(2003) (declaring the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the most far-reaching reform ever
passed).
166. Ultimately, if the PCAOB is upheld as to this facial constitutional
challenge, future lawsuits could potentially be on the horizon. If the facial
constitutional challenge does not succeed, a future plaintiff may be able to
bring an as applied challenged to the PCAOB's structure, if a public company
is adversely affected by the independence of the PCAOB. An "as applied"
challenge may also be easier to prove than a facial challenge, as a party would
only have to show that the statute is unconstitutional as to this specific case,
and not in all circumstances. See Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Thrning the
Commerce Clause Challenge "on Its Face": Why Federal Commerce Clause
Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 176 (2004)
(stating that an as-applied challenge allows for the court to find a statute
unconstitutional with de minimis actions).
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regain control of the financial market by finding the PCAOB to be
an unconstitutional restraint in the president's executive power.
In the end, to ensure that the core Article II powers remain intact,
the PCAOB should be invalidated, once again reaffirming the
power of the executive branch.

